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Hiring Teams, Firms and Lawyers:   
Evidence of the Evolving Relationships in the Corporate Legal Market  
 
Abstract: 
 
How  are  relationships  between  corporate  clients  and  law  firms  evolving?  
Drawing on interview and survey data from 166 chief legal officers of S&P 500 
companies  from 2006-2007, we find that  –  contrary to  standard depictions of 
corporate client-provider relationships – (1) large companies have relationships 
with  ten  to  twenty  preferred  providers;  (2)  these  relationships  continue  to  be 
enduring; and (3) clients focus not only on law firm platforms and lead partners, 
but also on teams and departments within preferred providers, allocating work to 
these sub-units at rival firms over time, and following ―star‖ lawyers especially if 
they move as part of a team. The combination of long-term relationships and sub-
unit rivalry provides law firms with steady work flows and allows companies to 
keep cost pressure on firms while preserving relationship-specific capital, quality 
assurance,  and  soft  forms  of  legal  capacity  insurance.  Our  findings  have 
implications for law firms, corporate departments, and law schools. 
JEL Codes: J44, K0, L22, L24, L84, M12 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1831544
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Hiring Teams, Firms and Lawyers:  Evidence of the Evolving Relationships 
in the Corporate Legal Market
* 
 
How are relationships between clients and service providers in the corporate 
legal market evolving, and why? Based on interview and survey data from 166 
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chief  legal  officers  (CLOs)  of  S&P  500  companies  from  2006-2007,  this  and 
related papers
1 investigate the purchase of corporate legal services.  
Standard depictions of client-provider relationships in corporate legal services 
suggest that hiring decisions have become akin to spot contracting based on 
individual  lawyers‘  skills.
2  Contrary  to  such  depictions,  we  find  (1)  large 
companies typically have ten to twenty preferred providers; (2) relationships with 
preferred providers tend to be enduring; and (3) clients focus not only on law 
firms and individual lawyers, but also on the qualities of teams and departments 
within the preferred providers, allocating work to sub-units at rival firms over 
time, and following ―star‖ lawyers from firm to firm more often if they move as 
part of a team. The combination of long-term relationships and sub-unit rivalry 
provides law firms in these relationships with steady aggregate work flows and 
                                                 
1 In other papers, we report on (i) the degree to which companies co -manage 
internal lawyers, law firms and other  professionals, such as public relations 
professionals  (Michele  DeStefano  Beardslee   2009a,  2009b,  2010),  (ii)  the 
evolution of law firm -large  company  relationship  from  an  ―agency‖  model  to 
―legal  keiretsus‖  characterized  by  convergence,  consolidation  and  partial 
integration (David B. Wilkins B 2010), and (iii) causes and consequences of CLO 
turnover (John C. Coates IV  2010). 
2 E.g., Gilson & Mnookin 1985: 385.  4 
allows companies to keep cost pressure on firms while preserving relationship-
specific  capital,  quality  assurance,  and  legal  capacity  insurance  –  that  is,  soft 
guarantees that law firms will stand ready to provide legal services when and as 
needed by their clients. These findings have important implications for how CLOs 
manage relationships with their preferred providers, and for how law firms can 
and should manage themselves to maximize these relationships.  Although our 
data  pre-date  the  financial  crisis,  during  which  large  companies  cut  back  on 
expenditures of all kinds and law firms engaged in unprecedented layoffs, we 
believe the trends we have identified will only be accentuated by these pressures. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. First we review existing literatures to state 
our  null  hypotheses  –  the  conventional  views  that  relationships  between 
corporations  and law firms  have been  getting  less  durable over time  and that 
corporate hiring is now focused on individual lawyers rather than firms – and 
alternative hypotheses to be tested against the data (Part I). We then describe our 
methods (Part II), and present findings (Part III). We conclude with implications. 
I.  Prior Literature and Hypotheses 
Research on the legal profession has not focused frequently on the interactions 
of large companies and law firms.  Economists have emphasized the asymmetry 
of information between customers and experts, the resulting difficulties customers 
have in ascertaining the necessity, quality, or value of the services (Arrow 1963), 5 
and  implications  of  those  difficulties:  suboptimal  investment  in  expertise; 
suboptimal  demand,  diagnosis,  and  treatment;  and  targeting  of  vulnerable 
customers  (see  Fong  2005  for  a  literature  review).  Gilson  &  Mnookin  1985 
suggest long-term relationships allow law firms to provide quality assurance to 
corporate clients, but they assert that the cost of information about legal service 
quality has been falling—in part because CLOs have become more sophisticated 
as they bring more work in-house, use multiple law firms, and impose pricing 
pressure on law firms—reducing the value of firm reputation in comparison to the 
value  of  individual  lawyer  reputation.  Gilson  1990  argues  that  increased 
sophistication  of  in-house  counsel  represents  the  client‘s  internalization  of 
diagnostic/referral  functions  formerly  played  by  outside  counsel,  and  that  this 
internalization has reduced information asymmetries and switching costs that in 
the past led to long-term client-provider relationships.  
Prior sociological  work has  focused primarily  on legal  organizations  (e.g., 
companies or law firms) rather than relationships among them,
3 although some of 
that work (e.g., Heinz &  Laumann 1983) suggests th at the legal profession 
generally and corporate law firms in particular are not ―autonomous‖ but rather 
dependent  on  their  predominantly  corporate  clients.  Slovak  (1979,  1980) 
                                                 
3 E.g., Nelson 1988, Galanter & Palay 1991; Lazega & van Duijn 1997; Nelson & 
Nielsen 2000; Samuelson & Jaffe 1990. 6 
interviewed 23 in-house counsel and 9 law firm partners in Chicago in the late 
1970s and found that in-house counsel maintained social relations with a number 
of partners at many law firms, providing them with outside options in bargaining 
with  law  firms.  Chayes  &  Chayes  (1985)  reported  on  the  increased  scope  of 
activity of in-house lawyers by the early 1980s, and found that in-house counsel 
had begun to manage the make-or-buy decision more actively, and that it had 
become ―rare‖ for large companies to rely on one or a few law firms. 
More recently, Uzzi  & Lancaster (2004) argue  that commercial exchanges 
may  be  shaped  by  ―social  attachments  and  affiliations,‖  including  long-term 
relationships, which generate trust and shared norms. These relationships, they 
claim, may encourage sharing of ―soft‖ (non-verifiable) information, increasing 
the predictability and reducing the costs of governance of market exchange (Uzzi 
& Lancaster 2004). At the same time, trusting relationships may facilitate fraud 
(Heimer 2001) and have other negative effects.  Uzzi & Lancaster also report in 
their data supplement
4 that they ―found no evidence that corporate clients were 
more likely to sever relations with law firms‖ over the period 1989 to 1995.  This 
finding is consistent with our findings from the mid-2000s, reported below. 
We extend the foregoing picture in several ways.  First, we note that long-
term  relationships  can  serve  important  purposes  in  addition  to  reducing 
                                                 
4 See http://www2.asanet.org/journals/asr/2004/uzzi.pdf, at 8. 7 
information  asymmetries  or  encouraging  the  development  of  client-specific 
knowledge. Another benefit of long-term relationships – legal capacity insurance 
– has been noted in the trade press but not in the academic literature.  In effect, a 
law firm sells a soft guarantee that it stands ready to provide legal services when 
and as needed by the client. The client pays for the insurance by providing a 
steady flow of work to the law firm over time. The insurance is ―soft‖ because the 
law firm does not have a legal obligation to provide the services, and may be 
prevented  from  doing  so  in  the  event  of  unexpected  conflicts  of  interest  or 
capacity constraints. The insurance is nevertheless worth paying for because a 
larger corporate client can generally count on a preferred provider to maintain 
sufficient capacity that it could handle new matters (within reasonable limits) if 
the client has unexpected legal needs and to decline work for other clients that 
would lead to a conflict. 
Why don‘t large companies, in effect, self-insure by hiring qualified in-house 
lawyers?    One  reason  is  that  legal  needs  are  variable,  unpredictable,  and 
correlated with the legal needs of other rival clients. For example, merger and 
acquisition (M&A) transactions in a given industry tend to cluster in relatively 
tight time periods (Mitchell and Mulherin 1996) due to regulatory, technology and 
supply factor shocks. Clustering also occurs in some kinds of significant business 
litigation, as plaintiffs‘ attorneys bring copycat lawsuits against defendants selling 
similar  products,  or  suffering  similar  declines  in  stock  prices.    Because  legal 8 
needs are variable and unpredictable, it is not cost-effective for companies to keep 
enough qualified lawyers on their full-time payrolls to respond to surges in legal 
demand. A law firm can pool the variable demand each client may have, lowering 
overall  volatility  of  demand  if  the  clients‘  needs  are  not  entirely  positively 
correlated. 
Because  legal  needs  are  often  correlated  for  competitors,  companies  can 
expect to have legal needs at the same time their competitors have the same legal 
needs. Even if a law firm could handle multiple matters for multiple companies 
without violating formal conflict rules, the strain on a single law firm‘s capacity 
would reduce the quality of the services the firm provides. A company in a long-
term relationship with that firm can expect (and demand) the firm give its matters 
priority  over  competitors.  Finally,  because  law  firms  are  viewed  as  having 
variable quality  –  with  some firms  being viewed as  having  better lawyers on 
average than lawyers at other firms – a corporate client that does not have any 
long-term relationships with quality firms will not be able to count on finding any 
high-quality firm to handle its matters if demand clustering occurs.  
 
Second, there are intra-client complications to the conventional theories of 
client/attorney relationships: (1) CLOs are agents, too, and may act in ways that 
systematically  depart  from  the  interests  of  their  corporate  employers,  both 
generally and in choosing and monitoring law firms specifically; (2) CLOs are 9 
only one of many agents inside a corporation, and do not have the power (even if 
they had the correct incentives) to monitor or make decisions about the retention 
of  law  firm  agents,  but  must  compete  (in  a  form  of  influence  contest)  for 
resources necessary to override the preferences with respect to outside law firms 
of other corporate officers, who may be more or less effective monitors of those 
law firms than the CLOs; and (3) corporations are not infrequently agents, too, 
bundling legal and other (often financial) services to resell them to their clients, 
and may have weak incentives to monitor their law firms, at least to the extent 
they are able to pass through costs to the corporation‘s clients. 
Third, we note that long-term relationships vary – some are exclusive for both 
parties (bilateral monopolies), some are exclusive for one party (monopolies and 
monopsonies),  some  are  not  exclusive  for  either  party.
5  Companies need not 
choose between exclusive long -term relationships, on the one hand, and spot 
contracting, on the other: they can develop multiple, non -exclusive long-term 
                                                 
5 Prior research on law firms has not sharply distinguished between these variants, 
assimilating them into a stylized image of monopsony:  a long-term relationship 
in which a company exclusively relies on one law firm, which in turn is free to 
work for multiple companies, subject to conflict-of-interest rules, an image drawn 
from depictions of the corporate legal  market during the law firm ―golden age‖ 
(the middle of the twentieth century), as in Galanter and Palay 1991. 10 
relationships  with  rival  law  firms.  It  is  exclusivity  (and  not  long-term 
relationships per se) that generate certain kinds of costs: (1) dependency, in the 
form of bargaining power on the part of the monopsonist, or more specifically, the 
risk that a law firm may hold up a company for above-market fees, or shirk on 
cost-adjusted  quality,  and  (2)  blunt  incentives,  with  law  firms  not  needing  to 
worry as much about providing responsive or high-quality services as they would 
in a spot market setting. Non-exclusive long-term relationships may be able to 
provide  benefits  without  generating  all  of  the  costs  of  exclusive  long-term 
relationships.  By  maintaining  long-term  relationships,  the  companies  retain  at 
least some of the benefits of quality assurance, firm-specific knowledge, and legal 
capacity insurance. But by maintaining non-exclusive relationships with multiple 
law firms, they also can reduce their dependency and preserve sharp incentives 
for those firms. 
Fourth, the degree to which law firms  function as integrated organizations 
remains an open question. Anecdotal reports suggest that many law firms function 
more as networks of co-branded cooperative teams than as integrated firms. Law 
firms  to  date  have  typically  retained  little  capital,  rarely  obtained  significant 
outside  capital  (even  long-term  debt),  own  few  fixed  assets,  have  weak 
management structures, and have been unable (for regulatory reasons, in the US) 
to prevent other firms from hiring away lawyers. Lawyer turnover has been high 
in recent years, amounting to yearly attrition of close to 25% for all lawyers, and 11 
far higher percentages of associates.
6 Extensive lateral hiring may increase the 
variability of the quality of lawyers at the same firm, even those providing similar 
services. Law firms are typically organized as nested pyramids, with little cross -
cutting  communication  or  sharing  of  tasks.  This  is  particularly  true  of  the 
increasing number of firms in the U.S. that have moved from ―lockstep‖ to ―eat 
what  you  kill‖  compensation  systems  where  the  majority  of  a  partner‘s 
compensation is determined by his or her individual contribution to the bottom 
line.
7 As a result, a given set of legal services may be performed best in small, 
modular, discrete teams. If law firms are best concei ved not as tightly integrated 
organizations, but as weakly integrated networks of co -branded teams, then a 
company may be able (and have reasons) to maintain a relationship with a given 
law firm while retaining the flexibility to pick and choose among the  teams of 
lawyers at that firm, even for relatively similar work. As a result, the smaller units 
within law firms (teams, departments) may be as important for large corporate 
                                                 
6 See Heinz, et al 2005 (discussing the increasing lateral movement of partners); 
NALP 1998 (presenting evidence that more than 40% of all enterin g associates 
have left their initial law firm within three years). See also AJDII  2009 (reporting 
that 55% of all associates working for law firms of over 250 lawyers in 2003 were 
no longer at the same firms in 2007).   
7 Regan 2004. 12 
clients as firms or individuals for addressing asymmetric information, building 
relationship-specific  capital,  and  addressing  bargaining  power.  Because  most 
currently  available  objective  data  about  legal  services  (e.g.,  rankings,  league 
tables, surveys) are about law firms, however, it is likely that CLOs that seek to 
use such information will be more likely to make legal purchasing decisions at the 
firm-level.  
In sum, the two related null hypotheses – the conventional wisdom – that we 
test with our data are as follows: 
1a.  As information asymmetries have declined over time between large 
companies and outside law firms, long-term relationships have declined 
in importance. 
and 
1b.  As long-term relationships between companies and law firms have 
declined,  large  companies  have  come  to  identify  individual  lawyers 
(rather than law firms) as the focus of hiring and firing decisions. 
The competing, alternative hypotheses, are: 
2a.    Long-term  relationships  remain  important  in  law  firm  hiring 
decisions at large companies. 
and 13 
2b.    Large  companies  identify  the  relevant  units  for  hiring  and  firing 
decisions as including not only individuals but also teams, departments, 
and whole firms. 
III.  Methods  
To explore the foregoing hypotheses, we study self-reported perceptions of 
CLOs of large corporations about how they hire, fire, and evaluate law firms. Our 
targets  of  inference  are  large  US  public  corporations,  and  we  focus  on  the 
S&P 500, which constitutes ~75% of the equity market capitalization of US stock 
markets.
8 Our data include (1) detailed interviews with 44 CLOs
9 of S&P 500 
                                                 
8 A committee of analysts at Standard & Poor‘s selects the S&P 500 from among 
companies whose stock trades on the New York Stock Exchange or Nasdaq with 
the goal of including a representative selection of industries in the US economy; 
most  companies  are  US.  The  Fortune  500,  by  contrast,  includes  the  500  US 
companies with the largest revenues, regardless of industry composition. 
9 Although some of the interviewees had the title ―General Counsels‖ and two 
were  deputy  general  counsels,  we  refer  to  the  interview  subjects  generally  as 
―CLOs‖ for brevity. 14 
corporations, and (2) a survey sent to CLOs of all S&P 500 companies on 31 
December 2006, which elicited a 28% response rate (n=139).
10 
A.  Interviews 
For  interviews,  we  oversampled  three  sectors  –  banks  (commercial  and 
investment), petroleum companies, and pharmaceutical companies. Each of these 
sectors has high demand for legal services.
11 All CLOs in the selected sectors 
were contacted by phone and/or by email on average three to four times. CLOs 
were told that the interview topic was the way in which their companies purchase, 
assess, and monitor legal services. They were also told they and their companies 
would remain anonymous.  
                                                 
10 Seventeen survey respondents were also interviewed, so our total number of 
unique CLO respondents is 166 = 44 + 139 - 17.  The survey itself is available at 
[URL to come]. 
11  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics  data  show  that  of  lawyers  in  the  private  sector 
outside of law firms and temp agencies, 12% work in financial companies, 4% 
work in pharmaceutical manufacturing and scientific research industries, and 2% 
work in oil and gas companies.  The only for-profit industries with higher legal 
employment levels are insurance, real estate, and management consulting, which 
are relatively underrepresented in the S&P 500 because many companies in those 
industries are not publicly traded. 15 
From July 2006 to November 2007, forty-three interviews were conducted 
across the three selected sectors. Fifteen were conducted in person, the rest by 
phone.  Interviews averaged 76 minutes in length. All but five were recorded and 
transcribed.
12  Interviews included a combination of closed-ended and open-ended 
questions.  
B.  Survey 
After pre-testing, the survey was slightly revised and mailed to all S&P 500 
companies. The survey elicited a 28% response rate, including 17 of our interview 
respondents, for a total sample (interview and survey) of 166, representing a third 
of  the  entire  S&P  500.    The  survey  respondents‘  companies  accounted  for 
between 30% and 40% of the S&P 500‘s revenues, assets and employees. The 
survey contained 26 multi-part questions and took an estimated 15 minutes to fill 
out.  The survey also requested that CLOs include a copy of their curriculum vitae 
with their survey response, and 80 CLOs did so.  While interviews concentrated 
on financial services, pharmaceuticals, and oil companies, survey response rates 
did not vary in statistically significant ways across major industry categories. 
IV.  Findings 
                                                 
12 For the five interviews in which the interviewees would not allow a recording, 
the interviewers typed or handwrote notes during the interview. 16 
A.  Description of samples 
For  both  interviews  and  surveys,  we  compared  companies  at  which 
respondents and non-respondents worked, and found that in most respects the two 
subsamples  were  similar.  Survey  respondents  had  somewhat  larger  legal 
departments,  revenue,  operating  expenses,  and  demand  for  legal  service,  but 
respondents  and  non-respondents  had  statistically  equivalent  levels  of  assets, 
long-term  debt,  earnings  before  interest  and  taxes,  net  income,  and  reported 
litigation settlements.   
Table 1.  Summary Statistics on Companies in 2006 
    N  Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Survey Respondents       
Assets    135  61974.7  180699.7 
Employees    135  66.4  170.4 
Net Income    135  1748.9  3510.2 
Revenue    135  23448.5  42000.5 
         
Interview Respondents         
Assets    41  308824.3  463026.6 
Employees    41  46.1  63.4 
Net Income    41  5714.7  8190.8 
Revenue    41  45995.6  67136.1 
 
Data Source: Compustat; employees in 000s; other amounts in $ mm. 
 
Companies.  As reflected in Table 1, the companies included in our samples 
were large (survey respondents‘ companies had on average assets of $62 billion 
and revenues of $23 billion) and profitable (survey respondents‘ companies had 17 
on  average  earnings  of  $1.7  billion).    Less  than  five  percent  of  survey 
respondents‘  companies  had  net  losses  for  the  year.  They  were  important 
employers, with between 2,000 and 280,000 employees, at the fifth and ninety-
fifth percentile, respectively. The median survey respondent company had 23,000 
employees.  Interview  participants  worked  for  even  larger  companies,  with 
average 2006 assets of $309 billion, revenues of $46 billion, and earnings of $5.7 
billion.    Year-to-year  correlations  for  these  measures  of  company  size  and 
profitability during 2004-2006 were high, suggesting that aggregate legal demand 
should be stable in our study period. 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics on Legal Departments of Respondents 
 
  Mean  Min  25
th 
p-tile 
Median  75
th 
p-tile 
Max  N 
Survey Respondents 
 
Legal budget in 2006  65.42  3.50  15.00  37.00  76.00  606.0  131 
% spent on law firms  60%  2%  20%  60%  70%  97%  130 
# of law firms in 2006  127.05  5  30  65  150  1000  133 
… in 2003  141.82  4  27  75  170  1000  117 
# of top firms in 2006  15.09  1  5  10  20  110  135 
…in 2003  17.31  1  5  10  25  100  115 
Change in top firms ‗03 to ‗06  -2.2  -80  -2  0  1  44  114 
# of lawyers   68.85  0  17  35  75  1250  134 
CLOs reporting to CEO  89.2%            139 
CLOs male  80.0%            80 
Tenure of CLOs [1]  4.6  1  2  3  7  19  80 
Tenure at company [1]  9.6  1  3  6.5  14  35  86 
CLO promoted from within [1]  56.4%            78 
CLO salary [2]  468.6  201.92  356.00  420.42  517.50  1513.2  46 
CLO total compensation [2]  2459.9  463.53  1287.16  2208.32  3099.67  7278.6  39 
% CLOs male [2]  87.0%            46 
               
Data from Interview Participants 
 
Legal budget in 2006  210.79  10.00  40.00  91.50  332.64  750.0  18 
% spent on law firms  53%  20%  40%  50%  64%  90%  27 
# of law firms   239.86  6  40  150  300  1000  29 
# of top firms   20.00  1  5  10  20  100  31 
Use preferred provider lists  60%            40 
Preferred provider lists that are 
mandatory 
17.5%            40 
# of lawyers   161.07  2  40  100  150  1480  41 
# of non-lawyers in legal 
department 
112.17  3  112  75  112  500  23 
CLOs reporting to CEO  59.5%            41 
CLOs male  76.7%            41 
CLOs oversee compliance  81.0%            40 
 
Notes.  Data sources are surveys or interviews except as noted:  [1] American Lawyer 2007 Survey of 
Fortune 500 Legal Departments; [2] Execucomp.  Data from 2006 unless otherwise noted.  Legal budgets 
exclude compliance.  ―Top firms‖ means firms receiving 80% of outside legal expenditures.  Legal 
expenditures are in $mm; salary and total compensation are in $000. 
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Legal  Departments.  The  legal  departments  overseen  by  our  respondents 
varied in size and importance (see Table 2). The median legal department had 35 
lawyers, but one respondent had wholly outsourced its legal function, and another 
company employed 1250 lawyers, which would place it among the largest of law 
firms, were the department organized as a separate organization. The distribution 
of the size of legal departments among survey respondents is skewed – the mean 
(69)  is  more  than  double  the  median  (35),  with  skewness  of  6.5  –  but  is 
comparable to data on Fortune 500 legal departments reported by the American 
Lawyer.  
By comparison, legal departments of our interview sample – which, recall, 
was designed to include the firms with high legal demand – is more normally 
distributed (skewness of 1.4), similar to the distribution of law department sizes 
reported by Inside Counsel, which annually surveys CLOs of what it reports to be 
the 200 largest law departments. Put differently, among large companies generally 
(our  survey  sample),  a  small  number  of  companies  have  very  large  law 
departments  relative  to  the  size  of  typical  large  company  large  departments, 
whereas  among  companies  that  have  the  greatest  legal  needs  (our  interview 
sample),  law  departments  are  large  overall,  and  their  size  follows  a  normal 
distribution. In studying large companies‘ purchase of legal services, researchers 
need  to  consider  whether  their  findings  are  reflective  of  a  ―typical  large 20 
company,‖ a ―typical large company with high legal needs,‖ or some mix of the 
two. 
Legal Budgets and Outside Legal Spends. Most legal budgets of our survey 
respondents fall in the $25 to 50 million range. But responding companies also 
varied significantly in legal budget size. At the low end, one company spent $3.5 
million on legal costs in 2006; at the high end, one company spent more than 
$600 million. Legal budgets are also right-skewed, with the average budget of $65 
million almost double the median budget of $37 million. Interview companies, in 
industries  with  high  legal  demand,  spend  considerably  more,  averaging  $211 
million per year. 
Legal budgets and legal department size are correlated (0.66), as are legal 
budgets and assets (0.53), net income (0.55), and cash flow (0.53). The number of 
total employees is less strongly correlated with legal department size (0.30) and 
legal budget (0.25). Our survey respondents spend a median of $1.1 million per 
in-house lawyer each year, and have a median of 1.9 outside law firms per in-
house lawyer; these measures are also highly correlated (0.79). 
The share of the legal budget paid to outside law firms (the ―outside spend‖ in 
trade jargon) also varies, though less than legal budgets. For survey respondents, 
the  median  is  60%  and  the  distribution  is  approximately  normal  (skew=-0.7, 
kurtosis=3.6).  For interview participants, the median is 53%. Whereas the one 
survey respondent  with  no legal  department  not surprisingly  spends the entire 21 
legal  budget  on  outside  law  firms,  the  five  companies  with  the  largest  legal 
departments (ranging from 220 to 1250 lawyers) nevertheless spend more than do 
other  companies  on  outside  law  firms  (an  average  of  73%,  compared  to  the 
overall sample average  of 60%). Again,  our interview sample is  less skewed, 
likely because it was selected from industries with high legal demand, although 
the difference in the shape of the legal budget distribution between interview and 
survey samples is less pronounced than for law department size (3.6 for surveys, 
2.1 for our interviews). 
CLOs. Most (89%) of the CLOs responding to the survey report directly to the 
CEOs of their companies (Table 2). Among survey respondents, CLOs who report 
directly to the CEO work for smaller companies ($49 bn in assets vs. $171 bn), 
but their legal departments and budgets are not statistically different from other 
companies, nor are the net income or revenues of their companies. CLOs are less 
likely to report directly to CEOs at financial institutions (60% vs. 94%, p-value < 
.001),  implying  a  more  hierarchical  structure  for  those  companies.  The  result 
holds even after controlling for the size of legal budget.  In interviews, 81% of 
CLOs also reported overseeing compliance. 
For a subset of respondent CLOs, we draw on data from American Lawyer’s 
survey of the Fortune 500 CLOs in 2007, the same year as our survey. For those 
CLOs (n=80, about 60% of our survey respondents), we can infer length of tenure 
as  CLO:  an  average  of  4.6  years,  with  an  additional  seven  having  joined  the 22 
company between the time of our survey and the time of the American Lawyer 
survey – consistent with a finding reported by one of us elsewhere that CLO 
turnover has risen rapidly in the 2000s.
13 Approximately 56% of the CLOs were 
promoted from  within the company, having been  at their companies for  a n 
average of 9.6 years.  
A  different  subset  of  respondent  CLOs  (n=46,  about  33%  of  survey 
respondents)  comprise  CLOs  who  are  among  the  top  five  most  highly 
compensated executive officers at their companies. For these ―top five CLOs,‖ we 
report data from Thomson‘s Execucomp database on salary ($420,000 median) 
and total compensation ($2.2 mm median) for 2007 – comparable to the profits 
per partner reported for top AmLaw 100 law firms in 2007. Top-five CLOs all 
report directly to the CEO. Of that subset, 87% are male, a higher fraction than in 
the overall survey sample (80%), or in our interview sample (77%). 
B.  Qualitative Findings 
 
1.  Convergence and Preferred Providers 
 
Our  survey  indicates  that  ―convergence‖  –  the  phenomenon  of  large 
companies significantly shrinking the number of outside law firms to which they 
                                                 
13 Coates (2010). 23 
direct the large portion of their outside spend
14 – has indeed occurred, as widely 
reported in the trade press. By 2003, more than 60% of our survey respondents 
allocated  80+%  of  their  outside  spend  on  fewer  than  25  law  firms,  and  39% 
allocated  80+%  to  fewer  than  10  law  firms.  (We  refer  to  the  group  of  firms 
receiving 80+% of companies‘ outside spend as ―preferred providers.‖) As shown 
in  Table  2,  survey  respondents  allocated  80%  of  their  outside  spends  to  an 
average of 17 law firms in 2003. Larger companies, and companies with larger 
budgets, tended to have more preferred providers in both 2003 and 2006; in a 
simple regression of the number of preferred providers on a company‘s assets and 
legal budgets (with or without controls for industry, using four-digit SIC codes), 
assets were significantly positively related to the number of preferred providers 
(at  the  95%  confidence  level),  whereas  legal  budgets  fell  from  statistical 
significance.  
But contrary to the standard depictions, we also find that by 2003 convergence 
had  already  occurred  and,  indeed,  had  reached  steady  state  across  large 
companies. From 2003 to 2006, the mean number of preferred providers remained 
essentially unchanged, at 15. The number of companies reducing the number of 
                                                 
14 Du Pont is generally credited with the first major use of convergence among 
large companies, having cut its US law firms from 350 to 34 in the early 1990s.  
Gibeaut 2004; Dull & Gould 2002. 24 
preferred  providers  was  40%;  the  number  increasing  was  30%;  the  number 
remaining unchanged was 30%.  More tellingly, the great bulk of the respondents 
barely altered the number of preferred providers, with more than 90% altering the 
number by less than five firms, and 86% by less than three firms. For a depiction 
of this steady state, see Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Noticeably, however, significant variation among large companies persists in 
the number of preferred providers. For example, a small number of companies 
changed their preferred provider list dramatically from 2003 to 2006, with four 
Figure 1 25 
companies  shrinking  the  number  by  more  than  30  (and  one  by  80),  and  four 
companies expanding the number by more than 10 (and one by 44).  
Some variation is attributable to industry-based legal needs:  in 2006, financial 
companies used 190 outside law firms, on average, compared to 111 for non-
financial firms (p<.05).  But variation exists within industries, too.  The number 
of  law  firms  used  in  2006,  for  example,  ranges  from  5  to  1,000  within  the 
financial sector, and from 50 to 800, even for large commercial banks.  Financial 
companies  do  not  use  more  preferred  providers  than  non-financial  firms, 
moreover,  suggesting  that  the  cost  of  a  significant  amount  of  legal  work 
outsourced by financial firms is passed through to clients. This is consistent with 
our  interview  evidence,  in  which  financial  firms  frequently  made  distinctions 
between the way they chose law firms for work done in connection with client-
paid transactions, and work done for matters in which the financial company was 
itself paying for the legal work. 
Interviewees  told  a  similar  story.  Most  CLO  interviewees  stated  that  their 
companies  had  already  undergone  some  convergence.  Generally,  the  stated 
explanations were efficiency and cost reduction. Many CLOs claimed the only 
way for a law firm – even a top-tier nationally recognized firm – to ―get on the 
list‖ was by agreeing to some discount or blended rate.  As one CLO  related:  
―There were two law firms who were very good law firms whose names  you 
would know that came back to me after a lot of to and fro and said, ‗Sorry, we 26 
don‘t think we can do this. It‘s not fair to our other clients,‘ blah, blah, blah. I 
said, ‘I completely understand. I respect your decision and we‘ll continue to be 
friends, but unfortunately we‘re not going to be able to work together anymore.‘ 
They  were stunned.‖  [GCIB  at  6]
15  In addition to discounts or blended rates, 
many CLOs talked about other restrictions they might impose on preferred firms: 
―we entered into this new relationship where we expected certain things like, for 
example volume discounts, quick pay discounts, 1%/2% off if we pay within a 
certain  time  period,  we  talked  about  what  the  extraneous  fees  would  be  for 
processing,  secretarial  …  [and]  they  have  to  accept  our  retention  guidelines 
because when we got here, they were giving us their guidelines so now they have 
to accept ours… What we paid for photocopy, what we paid for those sort of 
things. ... We negotiated a certain range of travel services, we expect the law 
                                                 
15 The codes in brackets represent the anonymized respondents: ‗GC‘ for General 
Counsel Interviewees (numbered 1 through 44), ‗IB‘ for Investment Bank, ‗CB‘ 
for Commercial Bank, ―PH‖ for Pharmeceutical Company, and ―P‖ for Petrolium 
Company.    See  Appendix  A  for  more  information.  See  also  GC17CB  at  15 
(explaining that generally those on the preferred provider list provide discounts or 
blended rates).  27 
firms that we are going to spend doing most of our business to use those services 
and get the benefit of the rates.‖ [GC7IB at 6]
16    
Although cost is important, preferred providers are not selected primarily on 
cost  or  willingness  to  provide  discounts,  unlike  firms  engaged  primarily  to 
perform commodity work.  Instead, in determining who gets on the list, CLOs 
said  that  they  placed  considerable  weight  on  fit  and  past  experience:    ―[W]e 
looked at ... who had good personalities and who was efficient, those were the 
other kinds of things that came into play that these firms were noted for those 
results and stood out from the others, and as we whittled it down to look to those, 
that's how they came out on top.‖ [GC26P at 14]
17 As another CLO explained 
when selecting a firm for this role, ―[I tend] not to do a beauty contest of having 
firms come in and do RFPs and proposals.‖ [GC26P at 10]  Instead, s/he tries to 
―identify firms with whom [we] already have relationships, that on a personality 
basis, the way they do their business, the type of people they are, meshed up with 
[us].‖ [GC26P at 10]   As the CLO went on to explain, this is as much about 
                                                 
16 See also GC30CB at 8-10 (explaining that firms at top of preferred provider list 
generally provided discounts or blended rates). 
17 See also GC13CB at 16 (―We looked pretty hard at the existing providers first 
to see the ones that were used most often to see where they were and whether or 
not we thought they were a good fit.‖).  28 
culture and fit as any specific policy or practice:  ―As a company we‘re ... known 
as a Midwest ethic kind of group, hard-working and honest and all those good 
things you think about Midwesterners. We looked for firms that had the same ... 
work ethic and, to the extent you can find, lack of ego, and develop[ed] a good 
synergy between us.‖ [GC26P at 10]  As other interviewees confirmed, if the 
cultural fit is strong enough, firms can remain on the preferred provider lists even 
when they refuse to provide discounts. 
Although CLOs pay considerable attention to getting the right firms on their 
preferred  provider  list,  considering  a  range  of  factors  in  addition  to  cost,  our 
respondents  also  emphasized  that  when  it  comes  to  particularly  strategic  or 
important matters they freely hire firms off the preferred provider list. As a typical 
respondent explained, in these circumstances ―[I] need to pick the best law firm in 
the country [and] I am not going to say to [a law firm], well, we‘d love to use you 
but  you‘re  not  on  our  list  so  you  know  we‘re  going  to  have  to  go  back  to 
somebody else who‘s never tried an anti-trust case before and hope that they do a 
good job at it.‖ [GC17CB at 15]. 
Even  when  CLOs  take  work  to  a  firm  outside  their  established  network, 
however, they continue to be concerned about the relational implications of their 
actions – both how their actions will affect their relationship with their core firm 
as well as how lack of a continuing relationship with a firm will affect the quality 
of the service that they receive.  One CLO captured the tension felt by many:  29 
―When I have my board saying to me ‗are you absolutely sure that that‘s the way 
the SEC is going to see this issue?‘‖ the CLO will call on the expertise of a law 
firm  that  is  a  recognized  expert  even  if  it  is  not  on  the  company‘s  preferred 
provider list because it refused to discount its fees.  But when doing so, s/he 
conceded ―I do worry that if I'm not using them on a routine matter or I'm not 
generating enough billing for them, they will not respond to me with the same 
urgency that I may feel on a matter. I worry about that. That's part of the trade-off. 
... I guess what I'm saying is that we will focus most of our business on the more 
cost  effective  relationships.  We're  not  going  to  totally  divorce  some  of  these 
firms. And we're going to make that clear to them.‖ [GC20IB at 12]  Said another, 
―We try to pick ... from the list [but] don‘t prohibit people from going off the 
list....‖ GC17CB at 15 
2.  Hiring Criteria for Large Companies in “Very Significant Matters” 
 
Our  research  suggests  that  convergence  is  only  one  of  the  ways  that 
relationships continue to matter in legal purchasing decisions by large companies, 
at least with respect to ―very significant matters.‖  In the survey, ―very significant 
matters‖ were defined as ―matters of strategic importance to the company, such as 
litigation with very large liability exposure, high-risk regulatory matters, and large 
M&A transactions‖ but not so significant that they would constitute a ―bet the 
company‖ matter. Regardless whether a matter was sent to a firm on a preferred 30 
provider list, relationship – and not price – was the primary consideration for 
hiring outside.  As an interview respondent explained:  ―the factors that drive me 
… for these types of matters tends not to be price. Price is very important to us as 
a general matter because we consume huge volumes of legal services. But for 
these more sensitive matters, price is not the most important or even frankly a 
significant component ... of deciding on an outside law firm.‖ [GC11CB at 4]  
Our  survey  data  confirm  that  CLOs  place  primary  weight  on  relationship 
factors when hiring outside counsel for important matters.  Survey respondents 
were asked to identify the most recent ―very significant‖ matter they had referred 
to  outside  counsel.    Over  50%  of  the  time  respondents  stated  that  the  matter 
involved litigation, with another 37% identifying strategic corporate matters or 
regulatory issues (see Table 3).  
Table 3. Matters Identified as  
Most Recent ―Very Significant‖ Matter 
 
  N  % 
Intellectual Property  13  9% 
Litigation (class action, consumer, etc.)  69  50% 
Regulation (antitrust, investigation, etc.)  17  12% 
Strategic (corporate, tax, M&A, etc.)  35  25% 
Other  5  4% 
Total  139  100% 
 
Respondents were asked to rate on a 5-point scale the importance of 17 factors 
that they may have considered in hiring outside counsel for the most recent very 
significant matter, with 1 corresponding to ―not important at all‖ and 5 to ―very 31 
important.‖   Column 1 of Table 4 presents the average importance given by 
survey  respondents  to  each  factor.    Three  relationship-connected  factors 
dominated all of the rest:  ―prior experience,‖ ―reputation,‖ and ―results in similar 
cases.‖  Across all matters, ―prior experience with the lawyer(s) or law firm‖ was 
identified  as  a  ―very  important‖  criterion  for  the  hiring  decision  by  60%  of 
respondents. ―Reputation‖ is as important, identified as ―very important‖ by 60% 
of respondents, although somewhat less often in intellectual property (IP) cases. 
These results are even stronger for financial companies, over 85% of which report 
―prior experience with the lawyer(s) or law firm‖ as ―very important.‖ ―Results in 
similar  cases‖  was  the  only  other  element  mentioned  frequently  as  ―very 
important,‖  being  so  identified  by  between  40%  and  50%  of  respondents.  By 
comparison, all other considerations included in the survey, ranging from third-
party rankings, geographic scope, and market share to profits, leverage, ethical 
infrastructure, and commitment to diversity were almost never identified as ―very 
important.‖ 32 
Table 4. Average Importance of Factors in Hiring Decisions, Overall and by Source of Knowledge 
 
    Internal Sources  External Sources 
  (1) 
 
 
Overall 
Average 
(2) 
 
Based on 
Personal 
Knowledge 
(3) 
Based on 
Intra-Firm 
Second-Hand 
Knowledge 
(4) 
Based on 
External 
Second-
Hand 
Knowledge 
 
(5) 
Based on 
Public 
Data 
 
Overall average    97% = yes  75% = yes  50% = yes  17%= yes 
 
Prior experience with lawyer(s) / firm  4.4  4.5  4.5  4.4  3.8 
Reputation of lawyer(s) / firm  4.5  4.5  4.5  4.5  4.2 
Rankings in periodicals  1.9  1.9  1.9  2.1  2.2 
Results in similar cases  4.5  4.5  4.6  4.6  4.5 
Size   2.9  2.9  3.0  2.9  3.2 
Geographic scope   2.6  2.5  2.7  2.7  3.0 
Market share   2.2  2.2  2.3  2.2  2.4 
Recent growth history   1.7  1.6  1.7  1.7  1.8 
Leverage   1.8  1.8  1.9  2.0  2.0 
Turnover rates  2.0  2.1  2.1  2.2  2.2 
Partnership structure  1.4  1.4  1.4  1.5  1.7 
Ancillary businesses  1.4  1.4  1.4  1.5  1.6 
Pro bono  1.8  1.8  1.8  2.0  2.0 
Commitment to diversity  2.7  2.7  2.8  2.9  3.0 
Profits per partner  1.5  1.5  1.6  1.7  1.9 
Partner compensation system  1.6  1.6  1.7  1.8  2.0 
Associate compensation systems  2.0  2.0  2.2  2.2  2.3 
Quality control systems  2.6  2.7  2.7  2.9  2.6 
Ethical infrastructure  2.6  2.6  2.7  2.9  2.5 
 
Table 4 also identifies how survey respondents obtained the information upon 
which they evaluated potential outside counsel on each of these factors.  As the 
row  entitled  ―Overall  Average‖  makes  clear,  the  most  important  sources  of 
information for CLOs is their own first-hand knowledge (97%) or second-hand, 
intra-company knowledge from other lawyers within the company (75%).   Only 
50% of CLOs reported seeking information or advice from anyone outside their 
organization, with only 17% consulting public sources of data to investigate the 33 
quality of potential outside counsel. In the two instances where the respondent did 
not rely on intra-firm sources of information, they relied on both external second-
hand knowledge and public sources of information.  
Our  surveys  report  that  the  selection  of  outside  counsel  is  almost  always 
determined by prior experience with the company based on the CLO‘s personal 
knowledge  about  the  lawyer  or  law  firm,  and  our  interviews  were  consistent.  
CLO  interviewees  stated  they  base  hiring  decisions  primarily  on  personal 
experience  with  the  lawyer,  team  of  lawyers,  or  law  firm.  This  personal 
knowledge, CLOs believe, helps ensure quality and fit. As one CLO interviewee 
explained, ―At the end of the day, it is personal relationships.  At the end of the 
day ... I‘m looking to you individually to assure the quality of the support.  You 
may choose to put other people from your new firm or other people you brought 
into your firm on this matter.  But I am holding you accountable for making sure 
that individual brings the same quality and competence to the work that I know 
you have brought here.‖ [GC20IB at 21] Another CLO described the selection 
process as follows: ―We begin with the premise that they must be the best in the 
industry, you know, must be subject matter‘s experts. ... [B]eyond that, they must 
understand our business and be able to work well with our businesspeople and I 
generally select people that the businesspeople trust .... [W]e might try different 
firms on different projects and the one that becomes the most trusted advisor is 
the one that I will use on an ongoing basis.‖ [GC2IB at 7-8]  Another put it this 34 
way: ―[T]he manner of interaction between the law firm and our company that‘s 
going to make me personally comfortable, make the other lawyers comfortable, 
and make my management comfortable. We‘re looking for not only people who 
can get great results and demonstrate their ability but also people you think you 
are going to be compatible with culturally ... And then finally I always personally 
take the greatest comfort in if I‘ve worked with somebody personally in the past 
and I can say – [in a] matter that could have a potentially big impact on my 
company and on me personally – I‘m the one to put my trust in that person.‖ 
[GC11CB at 5-7]  
In addition to quality and fit, interviewees noted the advantage of institutional 
knowledge  when  using  the  same  lawyer,  team  of  lawyers,  or  law  firm  – 
knowledge which often exceeds that of many CLOs, given their short tenures. 
One CLO described following a litigator through six different firms. ―So one of 
the reasons that I follow this lawyer everywhere he goes is that I don't have to 
reeducate him. ... I had a problem ... and talked to him about it and he said, ‗Oh, 
this is like the other time when your company did that,‘ and I didn't even know 
that we'd had that situation.‖ [GC2IB at 32-33] 
The  survey  question did not  (unfortunately, in retrospect) permit  CLOs to 
indicate, as between the two, whether personal knowledge of the lawyer(s) or 
personal knowledge of the firm (or submit) mattered more.  In interviews, the 
CLOs repeatedly remarked that they hired the lawyer or team of lawyers, not the 35 
firm.
18 However, after probing, it appears that it is hard for the CLOs to separate 
the two.  As one CLO explained ―yes you hire lawyers not firms, but typically the 
lawyer you are hiring is a relationship person within that firm who is providing 
80% of the types of advice that you need in a particular matter. They hand you to 
their, particular subject there, a real estate specialist in a particular matter and you 
say, you know what I like you, I like your firm, you have always provided me 
with  great  resources  but  this  one  [lawyer]  just  didn‘t  work,  find  another  to 
replace.‖ [GC36PH at 9]  That said, when they did not have any relationships with 
lawyers within a law firm, CLOs agreed uniformly that it was extremely difficult 
for the firm to get hired.  As one CLO explained, ―if those are firms that we don‘t 
have relationships ... a firm needs to carefully read our 10-K, other securities 
filings, read analyst reports about us ... -- and apply a little common sense; they 
know we‘ve been around for a while and we use a lot of lawyers and we use a lot 
of recognizable named firms. So, if somebody is going to break in, they are going 
to break in because they have something special to offer that they reasonably 
think we need. Those are the kind of issues -- they are quite rare I must say that 
have a chance for being successful.‖ [GC30CB at 17] 
                                                 
18 E.g., GC23CB at 19 (―I‘m also a big believer that you hire a lawyer, not a law 
firm.‖); GC31PH at 4; GC2IB at 15; GC36PH at 17.  36 
Results from the survey and interviews indicate that second-hand knowledge 
is also relied upon, particularly within the company, and particularly for relatively 
new CLOs. CLOs with shorter tenures are more likely to report using second-
hand  knowledge  from  inside  the  company  (p<.01  in  a  simple  regression,  R-
squared  =  .09),  consistent  with  a  new  CLO  being  more  dependent  on  other 
officers. This effect appears to be driven as much by power as by knowledge, as 
CLO tenure does not correlate significantly with use of second-hand knowledge 
from outside the company, or with use of public data sources, implying that the 
reason  the  CLO  consults  second-hand  sources  is  more  for  intra-firm  political 
reasons and less to obtain more information per se.  
Our  interviews  confirm  the  importance  of  second-hand  knowledge, 
particularly when the CLO is new. ―I mean I wouldn't call someone unless the 
other had direct experience. Otherwise, they'd ruin the place.‖ [GC6CB at 26] 
―[B]y and large my experience is that [CLOs] are pretty candid with each other. 
So, you know if I call somebody up and say you know some day you‘ll be doing 
the same things. Some day you‘ll be calling me asking I want to know about this 
lawyer. Did they do x, did they do y, did they do z? You can ask them pretty 
direct and probing questions. And I‘ve gotten some- you know, you know how to 
gauge  the  responses  after  a  while  and  I  think  those  are  extremely  helpful. 
Extremely helpful.‖ [GC17CB at 15]  However, such reliance is rarely to the 
exclusion of first-hand experience.  When asked how the CLO knew who the best 37 
person was for the job, a typical response was ―You know the areas of practice for 
us are very specialized. And communities of lawyers are small and everybody 
knows everybody. So it's who do you know who does this. And if I don't know 
that person, I know somebody who knows that person.‖ [GC2IB at 14] 
CLOs  also  identify  a  firm‘s  general  reputation  as  a  significant  factor, 
regardless of the source of their knowledge about the firm. [GC2IB at 21]  When 
asked how an unknown attorney from an unknown firm in an unknown location 
(e.g.,  Alaska)  could  convince  the  CLO  to  let  him/er  do  a  pitch,  the  CLO 
responded ―I think the answer is you're not going to ... if you're moving in from 
Alaska, you're not going to get me. You've got to work a little while and have a 
relationship .... [F]or me, people have the reputations and their reputations are 
well known. And so it's sort of the matter of I'm going to come to you more than 
you're going to come to me.‖ [GC2IB at 34-35] 
The fact that CLOs rely heavily on ―reputation‖ in selecting outside counsel 
complicates  the  distinction  between  ―hiring  the  lawyer‖  and  ―hiring  the  firm‖ 
because CLOs gauge reputation based on who works with the lawyer.  As one 
CLO recounted, ―the reason I'm recommending him in part is because he's worked 
with this other guy. They know each other. He's got a great reputation. I know 
him from reputation. I trust him.‖
 [GC2IB at 21] 
Perhaps it is not surprising that CLOs continue to place so much emphasis on 
factors such as prior experience, reputation, and prior results – and their own and 38 
their colleagues ability to assess these factors internally.  Each of these factors can 
be seen as a proxy for the difficult-to-evaluate criterion of quality. As one CLO 
interviewee  bluntly  stated:  ―I  don‘t  think  quality  is  something  that  can  be 
objectively  measured  [for]  a  lawyer.  Instead,  according  to  many  of  the  CLO 
interviews, quality (which is the main attribute they look for in a lawyer) is often 
equated with ―demonstrated expertise.‖
19  Interestingly, however, at least some 
CLOs believe they can judge expertise and quality on their own.  As one CLO 
explained, ―Law firms only tell you that they are experts in whatever it is. You 
know what, I wouldn‘t call you if you weren‘t an expert. I know who the experts 
are.  You  don‘t  need  to  tell  me  that.  You  don‘t  need  to  tell  me  that  you‘re 
qualified,  ‘coz  yeah,  you‘re  qualified,  but  so  are  14  other  law  firms  just  as 
qualified as you.‖ [GC2IB at 26] The assessment of whether a lawyer is qualified 
is  done  based  on  personal  experience  or  secondhand  recounting  of  personal 
experience.
20 
By contrast, public sour ces of data are only occasionally used, even as a 
supplement to personal or second-hand knowledge. When asked if they rely on 
rankings or other objective measures to make hiring decisions, a typical response 
of the CLO interviewees was: ―Yes, of course I have looked at them, but I do not 
                                                 
19 GC11CB at 4; GC30CB at 10, 36. 
20 GC30CB at 10; GC17CB at 14. 39 
really take them that seriously. [I] would not make a selection based on that. I 
may look at one that in this list a law firm comes to mind and I may give someone 
a call but I would not make a decision based on those rankings alone because you 
have to take all these rankings like everything else.‖ [GC31PH at 9-10]
  The lack 
of reliance on such measures is likely because many CLOs believe that ―[q]uality 
is a subjective assessment.‖ [GC30CB at 10]  As one typical CLO stated:  ―I 
know that there's been, there are movements to try to quantify and six-sigma and 
do all that kind of stuff. I don‘t think this is an area that lends itself to that. As 
much  as  one  might  argue  that  it's  not,  the  legal  relationship  is  an  extremely 
personal relationship. So if I don‘t like the lawyer that‘s working for me, I'm not 
gonna pick up the phone and call him.‖ [GC2IB at 11]  Thus, despite the influx of 
objective measures into the field of law, the survey and interview data indicate 
that the way CLOs hire lawyers and law firms has not yet changed materially, at 
least for very significant matters. [GC24P at 11] 
Where  public  sources  are  used,  however,  even  in  combination  with  other 
sources of information, interesting differences in decision criteria emerge.  For 
CLOs who did  consult  public sources,  a law firm‘s  prior experience with the 
company was significantly less important (p<.001), whereas the law firm‘s size, 
geographic  scope,  and  commitment  to  diversity  assumed  significantly  greater 
significance (p<.02), each rating over 3 (corresponding to ―somewhat important‖) 
on a five-point scale. As we indicate below, this may indicate the beginnings of a 40 
change, as ranking and metrics become more widely known and perceived to be 
reliable. 
3.  Firings and Work Reductions 
a.  Terminations 
Standard depictions of the legal market over the past twenty years would lead 
one to believe that large companies frequently terminate law firm relationships, as 
sophisticated CLOs – inspired by GE‘s Ben Heineman – shifted the purchasing 
model  from  long-term  monopsonies  to  ―spot‖  contracting  (Wilkins  2010). 
Contrary to that story, however, relatively few (about 20%) survey respondents 
reported terminating preferred provider law firm relationships more than once a 
year over the three year period 2003 to 2006, and over 30% report not having 
terminated any such relationships in that period. This finding is consistent with 
the finding reported above, that ―convergence‖ had reached equilibrium prior to 
2003.  But  the  end  of  convergence  alone  would  not  imply  the  end  of  ―spot‖ 
contracting  –  companies  might  have  ceased  cutting  the  number  of  preferred 
providers  but  might  have  continued  to  drop  and  add  new  preferred  providers 
regularly. Most large companies do not appear to be doing that, however. 
Our  interviews  are  also  inconsistent  with  conventional  depictions  of  ―spot 
contracting‖ and frequent firm terminations.  CLO interviewees confirmed that 
firing or taking a law firm off a preferred provider list (post-convergence) was a 41 
significant  corporate  event.  As  one  explained,  ―[t]aking  them  off  the  list  is 
obviously a big step, you know, you don‘t do that to people.‖ [GC30CB at 15] 
Instead,  CLO  interviewees  generally  reported  trying  to  solve  problems  with 
preferred providers before they escalated to that extent.  Law firm relationships 
survive in the face of cost pressures, one CLO explained, because ―they tend to 
replicate themselves, so that as some of the lawyers [charger higher billing] rates, 
they can‘t afford to work for us anymore, so they backfill [i.e., push the work 
down to younger, less expensive lawyers]. We have found the lawyers that … 
step up into the relationship are every bit as good as the lawyers that have … gone 
onto bigger and better things. So, it would be difficult to not want to go …with 
which you‘re very familiar and … comfortable with.‖[GC26P at18-19] 
b.  Work Reductions (The “Penalty Box”) 
By contrast, CLOs report that their companies reduce work given to particular 
preferred providers much more frequently: almost twice as many (37%) report 
having reduced work more than once a year in the period 2003-2006 than report 
having terminated preferred provider relationships that often, and only 20% report 
not  having  done  so  at  all  in  that  period.  Work  reductions  –  described  to  us 
separately by one CLO interviewee and one large law firm managing partner as 
being put in a ―penalty box‖ – seem to have become the tool of choice for CLOs 
seeking to manage firm relationships in recent years.  ―One case that I‘m thinking 
of, they, definitely, came in and pleaded to get back on our good graces, and, for a 42 
long time, we refused to do that, and then there came a time when we thought that 
enough time had passed and the people that were involved were sufficiently … 
and we took them out of the penalty box.‖ [GC22IB  at 31]  
Firing  is  a  blunt  instrument,  and  CLOs  have  become  more  refined  in 
punishing  poor  performers.  They  tell  their  law  firms  that  they  do  not  want 
particular partners, teams of lawyers, or departments to work on its business. One 
CLO described the situation as follows:  ―We had a firm that we used a lot, and 
they had assigned a lawyer to the case and our people and ... the quality was not 
up to our standards, or really up to that firm‘s standards and so we went to the 
firm and said, we have to take so and so off this case and we don‘t want him on 
any of our cases in the future.‖ [GC30CB at 16]  As a typical CLO explained:  ―I 
did have to speak with the firms and I did have to sometimes say – X doesn‘t get 
it.  X is just so driven by billing hours and doesn‘t know solutions.  Can you put 
somebody else on it?‖ [GC15CB at 19] 
Although unhappy at times with certain people and the quality of the work, 
CLO interviewees  generally did not report taking the work away from a firm 
entirely.  ―I would not engage the particular people in that firm again, for that 
kind of a project. I used other people in that firm.  [W]e still do business with the 
firm,  but  again,  we  just  have  to  be  more  tactical.‖  [GC2IB  at  18]  CLO 
interviewees remain with a law firm when they are not happy with a particular 
partner because ―[they] [are] able to say, we appreciate you [the law firm] ... it 43 
was the right thing to do; this one partner didn‘t work, we don‘t want to see that 
partner. But yes, there are other pieces in your firm where things are developing 
nicely and you do have a future.‖ [GC5IB at 17]  Although such decisions are 
sometimes driven by the recognition that the firm and its culture is the right fit for 
the company, other times the decisions to remain with a firm is driven by the fact 
that  the  CLOs  recognize  firing  a  firm  may  not  solve  their  problems  of  poor 
service.  As one CLO explained, ―If I have a fit and I fire you, I‘m going to go to 
another law firm that‘s going to have the same set-up with the same issues and it 
could happen again the same way. These guys already know that it‘s happened, so 
you‘ve already bumped your nose once.‖ [GC2IB at 24] 
According to many CLOs, ―the law firms ... are generally very good about 
making sure that [the CLOs] are happy with the people working on the account.‖ 
[GC31PH  at  10]  One  CLO  described  one  instance  where  a  top-tier  firm 
―provided unsatisfactory service‖:  ―[I]t was a very big matter, a very big firm for 
us and it had to do with the partner who had the expertise being called off on to 
another  [client‘s]  matter  ...  I  called  the  managing  partner  of  the  firm  and 
expressed my unhappiness and we got it resolved.‖ [GCIB30 at 15]  As another 
CLO explained, ―We‘ve had instances even with [our preferred law firm] and 
some of our preferred relationships where a particular lawyer has not delivered 
and asked for somebody else and have gotten somebody else, just to make sure 
that it doesn‘t work all the time, but it works most of the time.‖ [GCP26 at 17]  Or 44 
as another CLO put it:  ―The firms that we have relationships with you know, they 
like  us.  They  wanted  to  continue  to  do  our  work.  ...  So  they  were  pretty 
responsive ....  [T]hey understood ... – and they‘ve adjusted their staffing and the 
way they face off with us to take into account the feedback.‖ [GC17CB at 22] 
Although CLOs have issues with individual lawyers or teams, as a whole, the 
firms are often seen as responsive to the CLOs concerns and, therefore, willing to 
make changes to the teams as needed.   
c. Teams and departments 
This brings us to the increasingly important role that teams or work groups are 
playing in law firm hiring decisions.  Table 5, which is based on our surveys, 
depicts what happens when CLOs decide to place a firm in the ―penalty box‖ 
because of underperformance.  It shows that when the company reduced the work 
given to an individual lawyer who underperformed,  it also frequently reduced 
work given to others in the law firm.  Only in 10% of (11 out of 112) instances 
where work was reduced did the CLO confine the penalty to the offending lawyer.  
Much of the time, work was also reduced to the firm as a whole, underscoring the 
connection  between  the  lawyer  and  the  firm  in  the  mind  of  CLOs.    More 
interestingly, most CLOs appeared to treat neither the individual nor the firm as 
the relevant unit of analysis when handing out extra punishment.  Instead, in 54% 
of (60 out of 112) reductions, the CLO took work away from the relevant team or 45 
department  rather  than  reducing  work  to  the  firm  as  a  whole,  or  to  just  the 
individual.   
Table 5.  The Penalty Box:  Effect of Underperformance on Individual, Team, Department and Firm 
 
 
CLOs reporting 
reduction of work to 
preferred providers 
based on 
underperformance 
 
 
Reduced 
work just to 
individual 
 
Also reduced 
work to team 
(but not rest of 
department or 
firm) 
 
Also reduced 
work to 
department 
(but not rest of 
firm) 
 
Also 
reduced 
work to 
rest of 
firm 
 
Total 
Reduced work to the 
individual who 
underperformed 
11  7  28  37  83 
           
Did not reduce work to 
individual who 
underperformed 
  8  18  3  29 
           
Total   11  15  46  40  112 
 
Indeed, as shown in the second row of Table 5, companies reduced work to 
teams and/or departments even when the underperforming individual was not 
specifically identified as receiving less work. CLOs reported reducing work to the 
department and not to the individual in 26% of (29 of 112) work reductions, as 
compared to only 10% of reductions to the individual alone. These results are 
consistent with the theory that as firms have grown in size and scope, the relevant 
units of choice for companies have shifted from firms to teams and departments. 
CLOs  of  large  companies  are  acting  on  the  basis  that  individual  lawyers  – 
however unique they may be – can function as effective corporate lawyers only in 
conjunction with other lawyers at their firms.  46 
These developments are especially true for lead partners (i.e., heads of teams). 
When a team‘s lead partner or department head is underperforming, a CLO loses 
confidence not just in the individual but also in the whole team or department. 
The decision to not use that partner then leads to not using associates or partners 
that work with him/er.  As one CLO who reported having to hire a new law firm 
mid-matter explained, ―I don‘t think I‘ll ever use that person again because I think 
the  risk  would  be  –  I  just  wouldn‘t  have  confidence  that  the  same  situation 
wouldn‘t emerge again.  Plus, I realized that the team around this person at firm A 
was not anywhere near the quality of the team around the person that we now 
have [from firm B].  So although we made the shift because of the individual 
person, the fringe benefit is that we got a spectacularly good team now, not only 
just individuals.‖ [GC17CB at 25] Dissatisfaction with a lead partner, in other 
words, spreads to the whole team.  
Interestingly, this CLO also explained that there was one individual lawyer 
―who did not get along so much with [the] business person‖ but despite this, the 
company  ―asked  for  her  again  on  some  [other]  work‖  because  ―she  was  a 
showcase‖ and spectacular. [GC17CB at 25] Thus, CLOs understand that some 
individual lawyers will not fit with some of the internal employees and that law 
firms have a difficult task in figuring out the right staffing. In those situations, the 
CLO  may  not  ―penalize‖  the  individual  or  the  team.  At  times  a  CLO  only 
decreases the work to the team, as in the prior example, but at other times a CLO 47 
might  penalize  the  entire  firm.  Another  CLO  explained,  ―[T]ypically  what 
happens is that, there is a partner of the firm, who is sort of the lead partner 
working with us, and by that point, that partner is usually a part of the problem; it 
was  just  what‘s  happening  ...  there  [are]  100  firms  out  there,  you  can  find 
somebody who does the same things.‖ [GC5IB at 18-19]  When asked whether he 
would fire the law firm or simply reduce work to the team or individual, one CLO 
responded as follows:  
It would depend upon whether we feel that what happened here was specific 
to the individual or that there was inadequate oversight of the activity. ...[I]f a 
senior partner makes a strategic error in a given call, we might move to a 
different partner. If, however, the firm has allowed us to entrust business to 
the hands of a more junior lawyer, or a partner has without our knowledge 
entrusted the work to a more junior lawyer who made the mistake, then when 
it's  an  issue  of  management  oversight  in  general,  we  will  leave  the  firm 
entirely. [GC20IB  at 24] 
d. Causes of Terminations and Reductions.  
In our survey responses, the dominant reason given for terminations and work 
reductions was the quality of the services (60% of those reporting terminations, 
78%  of  those  reporting  reductions),  and  not  cost  (as  implied  by  standard 
depictions of cost-conscious CLOs overseeing a ―spot‖ market for legal services). 
Indeed, cost was mentioned on its own as the reason for a termination in only 7% 48 
(5 out of 68) of instances where a CLO explained their terminations. Given that 
we  directed  respondents  to  think  about  ―very  significant‖  legal  matters,  it  is 
perhaps not surprising that respondents did not cite cost as the most significant 
factor. Yet the fact that financial considerations were so rarely the focus of the 
decision is noteworthy.  Even apart from ―bet the company‖ matters, cost plays 
less  of  a  dominant  role  than  the  standard  depiction  implies.    (That  said,  as 
discussed above, cost is a factor motivating convergence.) 
The  second  most  common  reason  given  was  ethical  issues  (27%  for 
terminations,  10%  for  reductions),  followed  by  responsiveness  (19%  for 
terminations and reductions). No other factor was mentioned by more than two 
survey respondents.  
Generally speaking, these results track our interviews. Although a willingness 
to cut costs may help a law firm get placed and remain on a preferred provider 
list, cost was generally not a factor in terminations. The prevailing reasons CLO 
interviewees  gave  for  terminating  law  firms  centered  on  quality  and  service 
issues, e.g., knowledge of the case or client, and responsiveness. CLOs said, for 
example, ―I didn‘t feel they really knew the case ... They really weren‘t able to 
answer my questions to my satisfaction‖ [GC5IB at 18] or ―[T]he most important 
thing I think is to have understood our business better going into it.‖ [GC2IB at 49 
31]  Or the law firm did not know the relevant law or have the expertise.
21  Or the 
firm partner was not responsive to complaints about service or quality. One CLO 
explained that she terminated a department of a firm when the relationship partner 
did not respond appropriately to the CLO‘s complaints about a particular partner 
handling a matter and the firm went back on its word on what it would charge the 
company on the back-end. [GC13CB at 20-23]  She did not fire the law firm itself 
entirely because ―they‘re fairly embedded here; and so they‘re getting used for 
less and less as different people in different areas are starting to understand the 
differences in quality between other law firms that are available to them and this 
one.‖
22  
In addition to quality, the other prevalent reasons for terminating law firms 
centered on ethics, particularly conflicts of interest. Often the CLO interviewees 
mentioned conflicts. ―It‘s a fundamental affront to our dignity, so they were taken 
off  the  list  when  they  represented  who‘s  suing  us;  anybody  who  represented 
somebody suing us goes off the list -- goes off the approved list, not just the 
                                                 
21 E.g., GC1IB; GC6CB at 2; GC6CB at 23 (explaining however that ―[f]or the 
high-end stuff, it's like quality first and service a close second‖).   
22 GC6CB at 23.  50 
premier list.‖ [GC30CB at 13]
23 CLOs also mentioned unethical billing practices 
as being part of a decision to terminate the relationship.  One CLO explained the 
company ―had terminated relationships where we‘ve found funny business in [the 
law firm‘s] billings‖ such as ―[b]illing a 24-hour day to us and their other clients, 
irregularities.‖ [GC26P at 16]  CLOs did not draw a sharp line between violations 
of professional responsibility rules and their view of broader ethical obligations, 
such as so-called ―business conflicts‖ in which one of the company‘s primary law 
firms  was  discovered  to  be  working  for  a  business  competitor.    CLOs  report 
business conflicts frequently resulting in work reductions or even terminations.  
As one CLO drolly noted: ―[W]e are big boys and girls, and they made a business 
                                                 
23 See also GC17CB at 32 (―We had a firm that sued us and we were a client and 
they said oh no, no it was your subsidiary that was a client and … it was actually 
a firm that we merged with, so we don‘t think that that counts, and we have an 
opinion from our own firm‘s [CLO] that is going to say it‘s ok for us to sue you. 
And we said [OK]… But we‘re not going to pay  you any money ever again. 
Across the board, we‘re not going to do that... . [I] never [hired them again]. And 
you know, I just thought that was ridiculous. It was ridiculous so you know so if 
the firm takes that kind of unscrupulous approach to conflicts you know that‘s 
going to get them off the list.‖). 51 
decision, the result of which is, I took them off the approved list and that‘s fine.‖ 
[GC30CB at 13] 
In  taking  business  conflicts  seriously,  CLOs  are  responding  to  a  firm‘s 
violation of its promise to provide capacity insurance. As one CLO explained, it 
matters ―how sensitive [the law firms] are ... to business issues and concerns. You 
know, these law firms are enormous. You know, we certainly assume that they are 
not going to put themselves in conflict situations where there is a clear violation 
of the rules  of  ethics.  But  what  we also  expect  from  them is  that they  avoid 
situations where there may not be a specific sort of conflict in the legal sense. 
There is a conflict that‘s either an issue or with respect to a business counterpart. 
And, again, the better firms know that we have a high level expectation that our 
key firms are not going to be doing things anywhere, whether it‘s for us or for 
some other clients, that is at odds with our interest.‖ [GC18IB at 9]  CLOs appear 
to expect that their go-to firms be available and they get ―pissed‖ when ―their‖ 
firm does not check with them before taking on a ―possible‖ competitor or when 
they ask their firm to get rid of a new client and the firm can or will not: ―We‘d 
expect from our major providers that when taking on a matter if its crystal clear 
we‘re going to need help too that they don‘t take the matter... hopefully someone 
from our law firms would call us and tell us and ask us if we want to engage them 
before they accept with a competitor.‖ [GC1IB] Indeed, one CLO claimed that 
when he was with his old company, they ―terminated a relationship with a firm 52 
because where a law firm took a position that it did not regard as being adverse 
for purposes of disqualifying it from representing either [them] or a new client. 
But on a matter of principle, [they] decided that [they] could not be represented 
by  the  law  firm  even  in  light  of  the  firewalls  that  might  be  put  up  or  other 
typically acceptable ways of dealing with conflicts.‖ [GC20IB at 24] 
In contrast to quality and ethics, CLOs rarely described legal mistakes or bad 
outcomes as grounds for terminating relationships. Rather than point fingers at 
law firm counterparts, they often took some ownership and responsibility for the 
failure and expressed an understanding that things can go wrong. Given the close 
interaction between the CLO/client and the law firm, CLOs might find it hard to 
plausibly  blame  only  on  the  law  firm  (and  not  themselves  as  well)  for  bad 
outcomes.  As  one  CLO  explained,  ―So  it's  part  your  fault,  part  our  fault.  It's 
possible we didn't even ask the right question.‖ [GC6CB at 22] Even when CLOs 
do fire firms, they still recognize their role in the problems that arose.  One CLO 
described this recognition as follows:  ―We felt that in this piece of litigation they 
ran up a very big deal -- that‘s probably our fault because we didn‘t manage it, 
and  kept  telling  us  that  we  had  a  great  case,  and  the  other  side‘s  settlement 
demands were outrageous until we got right up to close to trial, when they said, 
well, you are going to lose and you really ought to settle for what they ask. I was 
very unhappy. That‘s our problem; we didn‘t manage that case correctly but it's 
not what I expect from any firm on our approved list.‖ [GC30CB at 13]  53 
When it comes to matters such as quality and ethics, they draw a harder line. 
Thus, quality and ethical issues, viewed as more under the law firms‘ control, 
were identified most frequently as factors leading to terminations. That ethical 
issues are more likely to be associated with an outright termination than a work 
reduction  suggests  that,  in  contrast  to  the  management  of  quality  and 
responsiveness at the sub-unit level, ethics remains a matter that large company 
CLOs perceive to be managed over the entire firm, so that lapses by one lawyer or 
team reflect poorly on the firm as a whole. Consistent with this finding, we also 
find in our survey that companies that have reported terminating firms are more 
likely to view ―quality control systems‖ in hiring a firm for a new very important 
matter.  As  shown  in  Figure  2,  more  than  50%  of  CLOs  who  did  not  report 
terminations  in  the  2003-2006  period  said  ―quality  control  systems‖  were  not 
important in hiring decisions, whereas 66% of CLOs who reported more than one 
or two terminations in that period view such systems as important (p-value of 
Wilcoxon ranksum test < .06). Although our data do not allow us to determine 
whether  more  frequent  terminations  make  companies  more  conscious  of  the 
importance of a firm having better quality control systems, or conversely, whether 
companies that pay attention to such systems are more likely to be disappointed in 
the  services  that  their  firms  provide,  the  connection  between  quality  control 
systems and terminations suggests that at least some CLOs are holding the firm as 54 
a whole responsible for failing adequately to monitor the quality of individual 
lawyers. 
 
 
In addition to salient triggers for terminations, latent structural factors are at 
work.  Law  department  size,  for  example,  has  a  significant  but  non-linear 
relationship  with  the  frequency  that  a  survey  respondent  reported  terminating 
preferred provider relationships. As shown on Figure 3, companies with small- or 
medium-sized  legal  departments  were  more  likely  to  terminate  preferred 
providers  than  companies  with  large  (101+)  law  departments  (p-value  of 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test <.05). The same is true of work reductions. Although our 
Figure 2 55 
data do not allow us to test explanations for these correlations, one conjecture is 
that companies with small legal departments are more dependent on outside firms, 
and that companies with large legal departments have many ties between different 
in-house lawyers and lawyers at their law firms, making both types of companies 
less likely to discipline their preferred providers than those with moderately sized 
departments. Consistent with this conjecture is the fact that terminated law firms 
rarely have accounted for more than 20% of the company‘s outside spend, and 
most frequently accounted for less than 5% of the company‘s outside spend.  56 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In addition, work reductions are significantly less likely if the CLO has been 
in office for a shorter period of time (p-value <.05 in a simple regression of work 
reductions on CLO tenure, R-squared = .05).
24 This could be partly to do with 
                                                 
24 By contrast, the length of the law firm‘s relationship with the company had no 
correlation with the termination: terminated relationships varied from less than 
five  years  to  more  than  15  years,  roughly  evenly  spread  out.  Likewise,  CLO 
tenure  has  no  strong  relationship  with  terminations,  although  the  sign  on  the 
relationship is negative, as with work reductions; the lack of any strong within-
sample statistical relationship may simply reflect the fact that there are so few 
terminations at all. 
Figure 3 
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institutional memory – if the CLO just joined the company, he may not have 
known about reductions in prior years and failed to indicate that the company had 
done so in filling out our survey. However, this result is even stronger for CLOs 
that had been in office for at least three years (p-value < .01), and were CLOs 
during  the  period  during  which  they  were  asked  about  terminations  and 
reductions. The inverse correlations between CLO tenure and work reductions 
and terminations likely reflect the relative power and/or knowledge of the CLO. 
The longer the CLO has been at the company, the more likely the CLO will have 
developed the political  capital  to  prevail against  other officers  who may  have 
relationships  with  the  law  firms,  and/or  to  have  developed  the  knowledge 
sufficient to make the quality assessments that drive those decisions. 
e. The Cutting Edge?  
Finally, we note that those few CLO survey respondents who report having 
terminated preferred providers more than once a year differ from other CLOs in 
several ways. First, as shown above in Figure 2, they are more likely to view 
quality control systems as being important in hiring decisions. Second, they are 
more likely to report relying on external sources of information in making hiring 
decisions for new very important matters. Third, they are more likely to report 
that the profits per partner of law firms were relevant to their hiring decisions. 
Included  in  that  group  were  CLOs  who  reported  terminating  law  firms  that 
accounted for more than 50% of their companies‘ outside legal spends. Together, 58 
these findings suggest that there is a subset of CLOs who are more cost conscious 
and less reliant on existing relationships and personal knowledge in managing law 
firm relationships, who work for companies with medium-size legal departments, 
and who are more aggressive in terminating those relationships than other CLOs .  
These  CLOs  may  be  outliers  who  will  eventually  be  marginalized  or 
reabsorbed into the dominant mode of the client/provider relationship described 
above. But it is also possible that these outward-facing and more aggressive CLOs 
are the leading edge of a new trend that will redefine the relationship between 
companies and their principal outside firms in a manner that combines the market 
discipline of ―spot contracting‖ with an appreciation of the value of relationship-
building,  along  with  an  understanding  of  the  structural  and  attitudinal  factors 
required to make ―cooptition‖ work in this context.  (See Wilkins 2010.)  Only 
time will tell.  
D.  Lateral Moves of Star Lawyers 
 
Finally, the survey also included a set of questions that asked if CLOs have an 
impact on lateral moves of ―star‖ (high profile) lawyers at the firms that serve 
them, and if they move work in response to the moves of star lawyers.  Among 
our  survey  respondents,  54%  of  CLOs  reported  observing  star  lawyers  move 59 
laterally.
25 The frequency with which the CLOs observed such moves did not vary 
significantly across industries, although, unsurprisingly, CLOs with large (above-
median) outside legal expenditure observed more star moves than did CLOs with 
small (below-median) outside legal expenditure (p<.10).  
In the majority of cases (57%),  CLOs reported that lawyers moved  to firms 
that were approximately the same size as the firms the lawyers were leaving.  In  
26% of the moves, CLOs reported lawyers departing for larger law firm.  Only 
17% of the lateral moves reported were to smaller firms.   
Of the star lawyers whose moves the CLOs recalled, 46% consulted with 
CLOs every time they moved, 21% consulted with them sometimes, and only 
33% did not consult with the CLOs. Although lawyers sought their advice, CLOs 
proactively suggested them to join specific law firms in only 11% of the cases. 
However,  15%  of  the  CLOs  reported  that  they  actively  engaged  in 
―matchmaking,‖ i.e., suggesting to lawyers specific firms that they might consider 
joining  and  suggesting  to  law  firms  particular  lawyers  they  might  consider 
recruiting.  Asked if he had actively asked a law firm to build up a particular area 
of  expertise,  one  CLO  responded  ―No,  but  I  have,  upon  being  pitched  for 
particular areas, told firms that the reason they don‘t get our business in that area 
                                                 
25 Groysberg et al. 2004 find that ―star‖ analysts move infrequently and less often 
than ―non-stars.‖ 60 
is, they don‘t have the depth that we‘re looking for, and that they could take and 
deal with that as they wish. So, I‘ve never suggested they need someone but I 
would explain that they don‘t get the work in some instances because they don‘t 
have the depth.‖ [GC30CB at 17]  CLOs are important informational conduits in 
the labor market for star lawyers and, at least in self reports, are more than willing 
to  advise  star  lawyers  on  their  moves  and  even  advise  firms  on  occasions  to 
recruit particular star lawyers. 
In addition to variation in where star lawyers moved to, CLOs also reported 
significant variation in whether these lawyers moved by themselves or as part of a 
group.  According to survey respondents, of the stars they recalled moving from 
one firm to another, 63% moved solo whereas 37% left with other team members. 
When star lawyers did move in teams, team sizes were generally small. Team size 
was greater than five in less than 30% of team movement cases and greater than 
ten  for  only  11%  of  the  cases.  CLOs  with  large  (above-median)  outside 
expenditure reported observing team movements more frequently than did CLOs 
with small (beloe-median) outside expenditure (p<.05).  Likely, stars serve large 
clients as members of teams, whereas stars serve small clients solo.  
There was also variation in whether the stars moved to establish new practices 
at their destination firms or to join existing ones.  According to respondents, more 
than two thirds (69%) left to join established teams, while the remainder (38%) 
established new practices or offices. To the CLOs‘ knowledge, star lawyers rarely 61 
(4%) replaced lawyers in their new firms who had either left prior to the star‘s 
arrival or were quickly replaced thereafter.  
Finally, CLOs reported that the vast majority (about 80%) of lawyers that had 
moved over the past three years were still with the firms they had joined.  This 
finding differs somewhat from a prior study on research analysis conducted by 
one of us which demonstrated that star analysts that move once were much more 
likely to move again and tended to have relatively low average tenure at their new 
host firms.
26 
These  variations  in  destination  and  the  circumstances  surrounding  their 
departure  and  arrival  had  some  important  conseque nces  for  whether  CLOs 
reported that they were likely to follow star lawyers by moving some or all of 
their  work  to  the  star‘s  new  law  firm.    As  Figure  4  demonstrates,  the 
overwhelming majority of CLOs (87%) moved at least some work to the new 
firms  that  the  star  lawyers  joined.    This  is  consistent  with  our  interviews. 
[GC20IB at 16]  The following account of one CLO, perhaps extreme in detail, 
was typical:  ―Eight years ago, [some of the lawyers from Firm A] joined our 
bank. But the ones that didn't come that did our work, a securities lawyer and a 
financing lawyer and a bank regulatory lawyer, those three partners jumped ship 
and went to [Firm B]. And with that jump, we followed them. And they were our 
                                                 
26 Cf. Groysberg et al. 2008. 62 
primary counsel. We were the largest client, I think, of [Firm A] for a number of 
years. They used to do all of our M&A work and bank regulatory work. That has 
changed now. They're doing less of our work.‖  And that wasn‘t all:  ―[Firm C] 
had an attorney who did our IP work, trademark, trade name. She's been in three 
different firms, and we followed her everywhere she's gone. She's built a team in 
each firm.  She happens to be at [Firm D] now. And so yes, we do follow people 
around.‖  And there was still more: ―In fact years ago, we had somebody doing 
our IP work and he went out on his own. It was only after several years that we 
decided that we really needed somebody who had more bench strength. And so 
we switched. But for a while we were using a solo practitioner to do that.‖  And 
finally  one  more:    ―[Firm  E]  was  doing  the  bulk  of  our  highly  sophisticated 
outsourcing arrangements. He was with [firm E] and we had a strong allegiance to 
[firm E]. But last year, he jumped ship to [firm F]. And we followed him there. 
And he's still doing the very same work that he did when he was in [firm E], only 
he's doing it for [firm F].‖ 
The decision to move work to follow star lawyers seems driven in part by 
whether CLOs place more importance on the lawyer or the firm. As the CLO of a 
financial services company stated: ―I‘m also a big believer that you hire a lawyer, 
not a law firm.  So, generally, the ability of that lawyer to service me is not 
impacted by the move or that there isn‘t any other specialized skills set in the 
firm;  that  enabled  that  partner  to  support  my  needs.    I‘m  kind  of  agnostic.‖ 63 
[GC23CB at 18] Another CLO answered differently: ―I know people move from 
firm to firm... . [I]n recognition of the fact that the people you rely on can leave, I 
am a little bit more flexible. We have those cases where we move cases when 
lawyers have left firms. There are cases and situations where we felt comfortable 
keeping them no matter even if the lawyer has left. [GC27CB at 11]   
But  at  least  some  of  the  decision  is  driven  by  CLO  recognition  of  the 
importance of sub-units, such as teams, and of the fact that firm reputations are 
important over and above their role as proxies for quality.   CLOs were more 
likely to move work if the star lawyers moved as part of a team (p<.05). One CLO 
explained his reluctance to follow a lawyer that went to a considerably smaller 
law firm: ―There are reputational issues.  I would never say, ‗Never,‘ but I think 
there has to be… it‘s partially reputational, partially, in a belief to the difficulty in 
adequately servicing from that environment, given the nature and extent of our 
needs.  Part of the value that they bring is their exposure to the market, their 
exposure  to  other  clients,  their  judgment  calls,  their  expertise  gaining  and 
representing other clients – it‘s not just the specific A, B and C they do for us. I 
believe that their quality of lawyers is the quality of clients they represent, and I 
think  in  a  no-name  firm,  unless  they‘re  really  experienced  lawyers  in  a  very 
specialized area, they lose the market sense, they begin to lose the client base, 
they won‘t get more significant client matters; they‘ll kind of lose their edge, their 64 
sharpness.  In things like employment law, that‘s less of an issue, but in our core 
areas, the regulatory and the transactional, it just doesn‘t work.‖ [GC23CB at 19]  
 
Figure 4  Work moved with movement of star lawyers? 
 
 
 
In about 75% of the cases where CLOs switched work with stars moving, 
they reported the quality of work did not change, whereas in about 20% of cases 
they  reported  the  quality  of  work  improved.  CLOs  with  larger  outside  legal 
expenditure reported more often than did CLOs with smaller outside legal spend 
that the quality of work improved after the star lawyer moved. 
In sum, it seems that CLOs view star lawyers as the critical client-specific 
resources, are willing to move their work to new firms to which their lawyers 
move, and are satisfied with the quality of work after the move. Once again, this 
result is somewhat at variance with the findings of the study of research analysts 
that found that the performance of stars in this industry who moved declines more 65 
than the performance of star analysts that did not move (Groysberg et al. 2008). 
This difference could be because of one of three reasons: (a) the legal market is 
different  from  the  equity  analyst  market,  involving  more  individual-  or  team- 
(versus firm-) specific contribution to ―stardom‖; (b) CLOs perceive and recall 
only ―successful‖ lateral moves of star lawyers; and (c) CLOs recall only those 
lateral moves that worked for them. 
Conclusion:  Implications  
   
Our  findings  are  inconsistent  with  the  ―conventional  wisdom‖  reflected  in 
hypotheses 1a and 1b, and are consistent with the alternative hypotheses 2a and 
2b.  Even if information asymmetries between large companies and outside law 
firms have declined over time, long-term relationships between companies and 
firms remain important.  Large company CLOs do focus on individual lawyers in 
making  hiring  and  firing  decisions,  and  show  a  willingness  to  follow  ―star‖ 
lawyers from firm to firm.  But they also focus as much if not more on sub-units 
and entire firms when making work reductions and selecting the relatively stable 
set of ten to twenty preferred providers to which they direct the bulk of outside 
legal expenditures. 
Our research  was  conducted before the current  economic downturn, and a 
follow-up study would be valuable. Nevertheless, we believe that our findings 
have structural roots that likely transcend – and may even be exacerbated by – the 66 
increased scrutiny of law firms stimulated by the downturn. At the most general 
level, our findings support the view that large law firms are neither ―autonomous‖ 
from  their large corporate clients,  nor dependent  in  any simple way on them.  
Rather, large  corporations  and large law firms  are interpenetrated  –  entangled 
with the other in complex and enduring relationships, and mutually dependent on 
one another. Corporations have taken the cost-cutting effects of winnowing the 
ranks of their outside firms as far as they can – they are now left with the more 
difficult task of enlisting the survivors to improve productivity.  Firms are subject 
to  discipline,  but  also  can  count  on  continued  flows  of  work,  absent  extreme 
lapses in judgment.   
For CLOs, our findings underscore that corporate clients have a greater 
stake in  the health of their top  law firms  than the standard story  about  ―spot 
contracting‖  suggests.  The  slowing  of  convergence  reveals  the  limits  to  the 
strategy  of  tying  a  company‘s  fortunes  to  an  ever-smaller  group  of  firms  to 
squeeze out costs.  CLOs will have to find creative ways to manage law firm 
relationships,  as  the  small  but  significant  minority  of  our  respondents  are 
beginning to do, by experimenting with more creative and sustained interventions 
in  the  legal  market  more  broadly,  and  by  developing  and  collecting  data  on 
performance metrics and other objective sources of information about quality.  
   Law firms are beginning to need to justify what was once purely internal. 
Companies are intervening in areas such as staffing by, for example, requiring 67 
firms  to  report  on  the  demographic  composition  of  lawyers  working  on  the 
company‘s  matters,  and  in  some  instances  mandating  that  firms  change  the 
―relationship  partner‖  who  oversees  the  company‘s  business  (Wilkins  2004). 
While we find that diversity does not play a primary role when companies are 
deciding which firms to hire for an important matter, the mode of intervening in 
the internal affairs of firms now prevalent in the diversity area has the potential to 
spread to other firm attributes, as CLOs seek to align compensation systems and 
organizational  structure  of  their  preferred  providers  with  company  goals. 
Dedicated  client  teams,  client-accessible  knowledge  platforms,  law  firm  run 
training  programs,  and  secondments  of  lawyers  are  all  ways  firms  can  signal 
commitment (Rosen 2002).  If companies now have no choice but to move from 
cost  pressure  via  convergence  to  productivity  improvements  via  active 
management, pressure is likely to mount on firms to adopt more such measures in 
coming years (Susskind 2009). 
For  law  schools,  our  most  general  finding  –  that  the  legal  and  corporate 
sectors are highly interpenetrated, with long-term relationships still prevalent and 
work organized and evaluated at the team rather than just the individual or firm 
level – suggests that students anticipating jobs in large law firms should more 
appropriately view themselves as entering careers in firm/company joint ventures.  
In such a corporate setting, legal skills need to be complemented by business 
skills: strategy, value, marketing, team-building, leadership, budgeting, planning, 68 
public relations, and control systems. Where those skills are best learned remains 
uncertain, but law schools could play a role in teaching students to work in teams, 
as business schools have long done. 
This brings us to scholarship.  Until recently, law schools have produced little 
scholarship about the profession they purportedly serve.  Serious interdisciplinary 
scholarship on the profession, although it exists,
27 is rare. Even fewer academics 
engage with lawyers about changes in practice. What is needed is a sustained 
dialogue  among  scholars  from  a  variety  of  disciplines  –  and  sophisticated 
practitioners – about the organization and development of the profession.  In this 
article, we have attempted to participate in such a dialogue and to demonstrate 
that multiple academic disciplines can inform and be informed by simultaneous 
application of quantitative and qualitative methods to a set of socially important 
professional  service  relationships.  We  look  forward  to  continuing  the 
conversation. 
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